Comments on Book IV of the Nicomachean Ethics – Part 2
After dealing with liberality, Aristotle addresses in Book IV of the Nicomachean Ethics the virtue of magnificence (megaloprépeia). This virtue is also related to wealth, but not to any use of it; rather, only to great expenditures. Magnificence is distinguished by scale: while liberality refers to donations and everyday uses, magnificence concerns extraordinary, solemn, public or highly honourable expenses, such as the construction of temples, religious offerings, civic spectacles or celebrations that involve the whole community.
The magnificent man knows how to spend large sums in a manner appropriate to the agent, the object and the circumstances, without vulgarity or ostentation. His criterion is always honour and beauty, not the display of wealth. He spends with generosity and pleasure, not with petty calculations, and always seeks to make the result worthy of the expenditure or even superior to it. For this reason, Aristotle compares the magnificent man to an artist, capable of imprinting proportion, harmony and grandeur on his works.
It is important to stress that magnificence is not accessible to all. A poor man cannot be magnificent, because he does not possess the necessary means; if he attempts to be so, he will fall into ridicule or excess. This virtue requires not only resources, but also social position, prestige and education, since it pertains to expenses that touch upon the common good, religion and public life. In the private sphere, magnificence manifests itself in unique and solemn moments, such as a wedding or the reception of important guests.
Aristotle recognises two vices opposed to magnificence. The first is meanness, which consists in spending below what is appropriate, spoiling the beauty of a great project by economising on details or begrudging every coin spent. The second is vulgarity/ostentation, which consists in spending excessively and inappropriately, investing heavily in small or ridiculous things, or with the intention of personal display. Both the mean and the extravagant err in criterion and purpose, but their vices are not considered gravely dishonourable, since they do not directly harm others; they merely reveal bad taste or excessive attachment to calculation.
Thus magnificence, as the mean, is the virtue that regulates great expenditures according to honour, beauty and appropriateness. It is not merely a matter of wealth, but of knowing how to transform resources into something worthy, beautiful and memorable, in harmony with the good of the community.
Magnanimity in Aristotle
In Book IV of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle presents the virtue of magnanimity (megalopsychía), understood as greatness of soul. It is the disposition of the man who, with reason, considers himself worthy of the greatest honours and in fact deserves them. For Aristotle, honour is the greatest of external goods, since it is the public recognition of virtue. The magnanimous man, therefore, does not seek honours out of vanity, but accepts them as something just, even though he knows that none of them fully corresponds to the excellence of perfect virtue.
Magnanimity, however, requires balance. The magnanimous man is he who adjusts his claims to what he truly deserves. He who considers himself worthy of more than he possesses falls into the vice of vanity; he who considers himself worthy of less falls into undue humility or pusillanimity. The latter is, according to Aristotle, even worse, since it means failing to recognise one’s own worth and renouncing the noble actions one could perform. The magnanimous man, by contrast, is just with himself: he seeks great things because he is capable of achieving them, but he disdains small things, which do not befit his moral stature.
The characteristics of the magnanimous man reflect his inner superiority. He performs few actions, but always great and memorable ones; he grants benefits with generosity, but is ashamed to receive them; he is frank in his affections, does not hide behind the opinion of others, and speaks with truthfulness. His relation to external goods is moderate: he is not exalted by wealth or power, nor is he cast down by losses, for he knows that such goods are merely instruments of honour. Even in his gestures and in his voice he manifests balance and calm, for nothing small or trivial disturbs him.
For this reason, Aristotle describes magnanimity as a kind of crown of the virtues. It does not exist in isolation: only he who already possesses in high degree the other virtues—justice, courage, temperance—can be truly magnanimous. Without virtue, the pretension to greatness degenerates into arrogance or insolence, that is, into a crude imitation of what should be greatness of soul.
In sum, magnanimity is the virtue of the man who, conscious of his nobility, knows that he deserves great honours, but does not allow himself to be enslaved by them. He is the opposite of the vain man, who demands more than he deserves, and of the pusillanimous man, who accepts less than is his due. In the magnanimous man, Aristotle describes the one capable of elevating all the virtues to their highest point, living not for applause, but for the fulfilment of that which is truly great and worthy.
The Tale of the Naked King and the Vices Opposed to Magnanimity
Hans Christian Andersen’s tale The Emperor’s New Clothes is an exemplary illustration of these vices. The king, obsessed with new clothes and appearances, seeks admiration not for his virtue but for the futile splendour of his garments. This is a clear case of vanity: he believes he deserves honour for something that lacks true greatness. At the same time, it reveals pusillanimity, for when faced with the possibility of being deceived, he does not dare to speak the truth, fearing to appear unworthy. His supposed greatness of soul is thus reduced to slavery before public opinion.
Around the king, the court and the people reveal another vice: flattery. Out of fear of seeming ignorant or inferior, all confirm the lie, reinforcing the circle of falsehood. Flattery replaces frankness and corrodes the authenticity of honour, which becomes a mere illusory consensus. This aspect is crucial, for Aristotle reminds us that magnanimity has a social function: a magnanimous leader elevates the community, whereas a vain and pusillanimous ruler drags the whole society into deception.
Only the voice of the child breaks this cycle. His simplicity and spontaneity recall the virtue of truthfulness, also discussed by Aristotle: saying things as they are, without exaggeration or diminution. The child does not seek honour, but simply states reality, and precisely for this reason he dismantles the king’s vanity and the cowardice of his subjects. In a certain sense, he is closer to greatness of soul than the monarch himself, for the truly magnanimous does not fear the truth nor needs to uphold appearances.
Thus, the tale shows that the opposite of magnanimity is not merely the absence of greatness, but the corruption of honour: when honour is reduced to appearance, nourished by flattery and sustained by collective fear. The naked king is not magnanimous because he does not seek true honours, and his court is not virtuous because it prefers lies to frankness. Aristotle would say that, in such an environment, there is no greatness of soul, but only a theatre of vices, where honour loses its essence and turns into ridicule.